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Swiss  Chilanpore  is a proposal  for a pension  reform  strategy.  It
is based  on a multipillar  structure  and aims to combine  the best
features of the pension systems of Switzerland, Chile, and
Singapore - leaving behind their weaknesses.
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of the paper  are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please
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Many countries  are considering  far-reaching  * All pension systems  have to cope with the
pension iefonn. This is happening  in response  to  problems  of long-termi  uncertainty.
growing  demographic  pressures  in some coun-
tries (especially  in Westem  and Eastem  Europe),  For these  reasons,  Vittas  favors a multipillar
to unsustainably  generous  benefits  in others  approach  that diversifies  across  different
(especially  in Latin America),  or to failure  to  providers.  Swiss  Chilanpore  would have two
ensure t':- profitable  investment  of accumulated  compulsory  and two voluntary  pillars:
funds  (as seems to be true with national  provi-
dent funds in African  countries).  - A first pillar (drawn  from the Swiss  model)
consisting  of two parts: a flat-rate  pension
Given the worldwide  interest  in reform,  one  proportional  to the length  of a person's career
could  ask: Is there a blueprint  for pension  and an earnings-related  pension based on annual
reform?  Can lessons  leamed in different  coun-  actualHzed  lifetime  earnings.
tries  be combined  in a best-practice  structure
usable  in different  countries' pension systems?  * A second  pillar consisting  of a central
agency,  which could  be public  or private, for
Vittas  reviews  the experience  of Switzer-  record-keeping  and other centralized  functions,
land, Chile, and Singapore,  countries  with'  and private fund management  compan.es  for
relatively  successful  economies  and pensica 1 investing  funds.  The point would  be to ktep
systems.  He suggests  a multipillar  pension  operating  costs down  and achieve  high invest-
system - which he dubs "Swiss Chilanpore"-  ment returns.
that would  blend the hard-headed  softness  of the
Swiss,  the expensive  yields of the Chilean  * A third and fourth  pillars based on
scheme,  and the ruthless  efficiency  of Singapore.  occupational  pemsion  schemes  and personal
He emphasizes  that:  savings.
* There is no perfect  pension system.  All  The proposed  structure  would aim to com-
systems suffer  from the problems  of moral  bine  the strengths  and avoid  the weaknesses  of
hazard,  adverse selection,  agency  costs, and free  the  three countries' systems,  but Vittas  cautions
riders.  that no reform  proposal would  apply equally
well  in all countries,  regardless  of local circum-
* All well-functioning  pension systems  stances  and conditions.
require good  government  and good management.
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THE WAY FORWARD FOR PENSION REFORM?
INTRODUCTION
Many countries  around the world are contemplating  far-reaching  reforms  of their  pension
systems.  In Europe, Italy and Greece are confronted with a  financial crisis of their public
pension  system  and suffer from highly fragmented  private or semi-private  sectors. Other OECD
countries are faced with growing demographic  pressures that put a question mark on the long-
term sustainability  of their pension systems.  In Britain, massive fraud in the pension scheme
of one large company group has endangered the occupational  pensions of large numbers of
workers, while in the United  States extensive  underfunding  of a good number  of large company-
based pension  schemes is putting a big strain on the  finances of the Pension Benefits  Guaranty
Corporation.  In  Eastern- Europe,  the  pension  systems are  unable  to  cope  with  the
macroeconomic  shocks afflicting  these countries  and have effectively  reneged on their promises
for  overgenerous and  unsustainable pensions.  In  Latin  America,  several countries are
considering a fundamental reform away from unfunded defined benefit systems and toward
structures that comprise as an important element fully funded schemes based on individual
accounts. At the same time, countries in Anglophone  Africa and Asia are moving away from
national provident funds and toward defined benefit social insurance systems.
Given all this commotion  and interest for reform, a basic question  can be raised: Is there
a blueprint for pension  reform? Are there lessons  from the experience  of different  countries  that
could be combined in laying down what could be described as best practice in creating a new
structure for the pension systems of different countries? The purpose of this paper is to bring
together the experience of  three countries with relatively successful economies and pension
systems. It puts forward a suggestion  for the structure  of a pension  system that is dubbed Swiss
Chilanpore. But before describing  what Swiss Chilanpore  is, it is important  to make three basic
points about pension systems and pension finance.
1Point Number One:  There is no perfect pension  system. Funded or unfunded,  private
or public, de:ined benefit or defined contribution,  redistributive  or not, there is no system that
can escape from the problems  of moral hazard, adverse selection, agency costs and free riding.
These afflict all types of financial  and social contracts, but are especially acute in the case of
pension contracts that span a period of 60 years or more.
Point  Number  Two:  All  pension systems require  good  government and  good
management  to function well and to have any hope of accomplishing  their objectives. A country
that is deemed unable to run well a funded or unfunded public pension system, because of
administrative  inefficiency, shortage of skilled  personnel, or political  interference, would most
likely also be unable to regulate and supervise  a private pension system. Conversely,  a country
that can effectively  regulate  and supervise  a private pension  system  can clso run reasonably  well
a public pension system.
Point Number  Three:  All pension systems have to cope with the uncertainty that
characterizes  human existence and the simple, but inescapable, fact that we do not know the
future.  (These  days we hardly know the present and we strongly dispute the past, but this is a
different story.)  All systems are exposed to the vagaries of macroeconomic  imbalances, the
peculiarities  and unpredictability  of fundamental  demographic trends, and the implications  of
changes in the relative scarcity of labor and capital.
It is because all systems are imperfect, all require good governance, and all suffer from
the effects of long-term uncertainty that a  strong case can be made for establishing mixed
pension systems.  Swiss Chilanpore is suc,i a mixed system.  It is not a new type of Swiss
cheese, but in the best traditions of good cheese-making,  it combines  contrasting features that
bring out the best of its ingredients. A Swiss Chilanpore  pension  system would  be based on the
pension  systems  of three countries, Switzerland,  Chile and Singapore,  and would  blend the hard-
headed softness of the Swiss, the expensive yields of the Chilean scheme, and the ruthless
efficiency  of Singapore.
2SIMILARMIES  AND DIFERENCES
These three countries have a number of features in common, but they also exhibit some
important differences. The first similarity  is that they all have compulsory  systems that covXr
nearly every worker, except self-employed  people.  The second similarity is that they rely to a
substantial  degree  on funded  schemes. The financial  resources accumulated  in pension  funds are
large in relation to national income in all  three countries.  The third similarity is that they
represent relatively successful  economies with high levels of national and houisehold  saving.
This is particularly so in the case of Singapore  and Switzerland. Chile has suffered from the
high inflation that has long characterized most Latin American countries.  But allowing for the
negative effect of high and volatile inflation  on national saving, especially  on financial  savings,
the financial  performance  of the Chilean  pension funds has been quite remarkable.
Of course, several other countries exhibit characteristics  similar to those of these three
countries. For instance, Britain and the US have large funded  pension schemes, though unlike
Switzerland  employers  in these countries are not compelled  to offer pension  schemes  to all 'ieir
employees.  In Britain and the US less than half of private sector employees  are covered by
company  pension  schemes, against 100% in Switzerland. Korea, India, China, Italy, Greece  and
other countries have high rates of household saving, but they do not have compulsory  funded
pension  schemes. Finally, France  and, perhaps  to a lesser  degree, Germany  impose  compulsory
participation  in pension schemes on their residents, but these schemes  are not based on funded
pension plans.
As already remarked, the three countries also exhibit some important differences. The
Swiss system,  like those  of most OECD countries, is extremely  complex  and opaque. Although
it is often referred to as a three-pillar system, it is in fact more like those modern American
houses that are known as split-level  contemporaries. The complexity  of the system makes it
difficult to measure its cost or to assess the investment  performance  of the funded components
of the system.
3For its part,  the Singaporean system is quite simple and,  as wiU be argued below,
opeationally  very efficient.  However, it suffers from lack of  transparency and produces
relatively low returns and benefits to its affiliates.
The Chilean  system is very simple and highly transparent  and is also supported by very
effective regulation and supervision. It has produced very high real returns, but suffers from
very high operating costs.  These afflict not only the pension system itself but also the private
annuity market on which it is partly based.
Unlike Switzerland, neither Chile nor Singapore incorporate in their pension systems
intentional redistribution in  favor of  low income workers.  On  the  contray,  both  may
inadvertently  cause unintentional  redistribution  that may be perverse by penalizing  low income
workers.  Nevertheless, both countries offer some forms of minimum  pensions.
THE  SWISS  SYSTEM
The Swiss pension system is typically described as a three-pillar system.  The "first
pillar" is a social insurance  scheme that pays defined basic benefits, the "second  pillar" consists
of the compulsory  company-based  plans that pay complementary  pensions aiming to achieve a
satisfactory replacement rate, and the "third pillar" consists of voluntary savings, including
fiscaly  supported pension plans for self-employed  people and other workers not covered by
company  schemes. But, as already noted, the Swiss system  is in reality a five level split system
with two of its pillars split into smaUer  and uneven parts.
The first pillar is a defined benefit plan and is divided into two parts: the first has a
redistributive objective and pays a  minimum flat rate pension given by a  base index that
amounted in 1990 to 800 Swiss francs per month or about 20% of average earnings; the second
part pays an earnings related pension  equal to an additional  20% of earnings, subject  to a limit
that the total social pension cannot be higher than twice the annual base index.  Thus, the
maximum social pension does not exceed 40% of average earnings.  The second part has an
4intergenerational  insurance objective, ensuring a replacement  rate of at least 40% of lifetime
earnings for average workers, irrespective  of the investment  performance  of the funded pillars
of the system.
The earnings-related  part of the pension  is based on revalued  (actualized)  average  lifetime
annual earnings, while the flat rate part is proportionately  adjusted to the length of a person's
career.  Actualizaton of lifetime earnings is based on the wage index.
The Swiss social pension system is redistributive in favor of low income workers.  In
theory, it can achieve a replacement rate of over 100% for workers earning less than 25% of
average  earnings. The replacement  rate falls to 40% for workers with average earnings and to
20% for workers with twice average earnings.  In practice, replacement  rates are affected by
the revaluation  factors  used by the social security system  and by the length of a worker's career.
The Swiss "first pillar" is a pay-as-you-go  system, financed  with a total contribution  rate
of 8.4%, equally divided between employers and employees.  In addition, the state makes a
contribution  from general revenue to cover 20% of pension  payments. Social pensions  used to
be indexed to prices, but since 1980  pensions  in payment  are indexed  to the arithmetic  mean of
the wage and consumer price indices.  Adjustment  is made every two years or when the index
increases cumulatively  by over 8%.
Because it is based on actualized lifetime earnings and is adjusted for the length of a
person's career,  the Swiss social pension system avoids the problems that bedevil so many
developing countries.  These provisions weaken the incentive to  misreport (understate or
overstate) earnings  during a worker's career.  They also discourage moral hazard since workers
will not be entitled to the minimum  pension  by participating  in the scheme only for a minimum
vesting period.  OECD estimates  indicate that the internal rate of return in the Swiss system is
higher for low than for high income workers, which is in  line with the intentions of  the
designers of the system (OECD 1988).  The social pension system does not appear to suffer
from extensive capricious  or perverse redistribution.
5Perhaps because of the proportionality  of social pensions, many old age Swiss residents
receive  pensions  that are inadequate  for maintaining  an acceptable  minimum  standard of living.
The Swiss authorities have been forced to introduce a supplementary  pension payable to old
persons with insufficient  means. This effectively  represents  a social assistance  pension, funded
from general budget revenues.  In the terminology  of a multi-pillar or split level structure, it
amounts to an annex or an extension that is attached to the first pillar.
The  "s zond pillar"  is based on  company pension schemes, the  offer o.7 which is
compulsory since the enactment of  the law on  professional pensions in  1985.  This  law
implemented  the constitutional  amendment  on pensions  that was first voted by the Swiss public
in  1972.  There is  considerable uncertainty as  to  whether the  second pillar is  a defined
contribution  or defined benefit scheme. In theory, the law specifies  some minimum  provisions
which relate to the contributions  that need to be paid each year.  These take into account some
targeted level of replacement  rate, but employers do not appear to be required to make up any
shortfall that may arise because of insufficient  investment  returns, except  that they have  to credit
each retirement  account with interest at a minimum  (nominal)  rate of 4%.  Thus, if the nominal
return is less than 4%, employers are presumably  forced to make up the difference.
The target replacement  rate seems to be an integrated pension of 60% of final salary,
though many large employers,  especially  in industry  and finance,  aim for 70% or more.  These
employers appear to offer defined benefit plans and to be prepared to make up any shortfall on
investment  performance. These schemes  can in theory at least be seen as a separate  part of the
second  pillar and to add credence to the argument made above about the split level nature  of the
Swiss system.
The constitutional  amendment  of 1972 and the implementing  law of 1985 did not have
as large an impact on the provision of company  pensions  as might appear at first sight. This is
because most large and medium size employers have long operated pension schemes for their
employees. The new law has had a much bigger impact on smaU  employers, who have tended
to set up contracts with insurance companies  and commercial  banks.
6The law specifies that the contribution  rate should vary by age and sex and should be
divided equally between employers and employees.  The rate starts at 7% for young male
workers between 25 and 34, rises to 10% for those between 35 and 44, 159%  for those between
45 and 54, and 18% for those between  55 and 65, which is the normal  retirement  age for males.
The rates are the same for female workers except that the higher rates apply respectively  after
age 32, 42 and 52.  The normal retirement age for women is 62.  Contributions  must be made
on covered earnings, which are given by the difference  between the annual base index and up
to six times that level. Employers are of course free to cover earnings in excess of these limits
and to offer defined benefit pensions.
Employers are required either to establish separate legz1  entities, often in the form of
foundations for these pension schemes, or to entrust their insurance and management  with
financial  institutions, such as insurance  companies  and commercial  banks.
The investment  performance  of pension  funds has not received as much attention  as, for
instance  in Chile or in Britain. Although  there,  are investment  rules placing maximum  limits on
different  types of assets, there are no requirements  for minimum  (absolute  or relative) investment
returns.  In fact, despite the private management  of the funds and the benefits of competition,
the real rates of return have on average been very mediocre.  Investing institutions  appear to
have ermphasized  safety at the expense of return.
Detailed data on the investment performance of private pension funds are not readily
available. Estimates  based on macrodata and on the known  asset distribution  of the portfolios
of the pension funds suggest that the average annual real rate of return over the past quarter of
a century amounted  to 1.5% (Davis 1992). This was lower than the average annual  growth rate
Of  real wages  which was 3.2% (n  highest  among the more advanced  OECD countries). Thus,
the negative gap between the real rate of return and the growth rate of real wages was quite
significant  at 1.7%.  In recent years, there has been an attempt to improve on the investment
record of the pension funds as both insurance  companies  and commercial  banks have started to
7compete more aggressively, to shift their investment policies towards domestic and foreign
equities, and to stress investment  performance  in their publicity material.
Although  most company  schemes are effectively  defined contribution  plans, they appear
to  suffer from vesting and portability problems.  Swiss law requires immediate vesting for
employee  contributions,  but partial vesting  after 5 years of service  and full vesting  after 30 years
for employer contributions. The law is unclear about vesting rights with regard to accumulated
investment  income.
The portability of funds is the subject of much controversy.  Funds can be transferred
to the pension  system of the new employer or they can be used to purchase  a restricted  insurance
policy from an insurance company  or to open a restricted account  with a bank.  However, the
calculation of the pension rights to be transferred raises issues of actuarial fairness that are
difficult to resolve.
Final salary defined benefit  plans of the "second  pillar" also favor high fliers (especially
managers  who get promoted  and receive big salary increases  late in their career) at the expense
of slow  plodders. Thus, company  pension  schemes  may  give rise to perverse redistribution  from
early leavers to  long stayers as  well as  from slow plodders to  high fliers.  In addition,
unintentional redistribution may occur by  significant variations in  real rates of return  for
members  of defined contribution  plans.  A guarantee  fund, financed  by premiums assessed on
covered wages, insures workers against insolvency of  the  pension foundations set up by
employers.
The "third pillar" consists of voluntary savings in the form of bank deposits, insurance
policies, other financial  assets, or real assets such as housing. In this pillar, an important  part
is played by personal pension  plans for self employed  people and other workers not covered by
company schemes.  These plans, as well as additional voluntary arrangements for old age
pensions, are supported by favorable tax treatment.
8Contributions  to the social, compulsory  company  and voluntary  pension systems (up to
specified limits) are tax deductible, as is all investment income.  Thus, unlike other OECD
countries, the tax treatment in Switzerland does not discriminate against the social system.
Moreover, the government contribution to the first pillar may be justified as an attempt to
equalize the fiscal benefits across pillars.  Pension benefits are generally  subject to income tax.
Because of the complexity  and opaqueness  of the system, it is not easy to calculate its
total operating costs and the required total cuntribution rate for achieving targeted pensions.
Estimates  by consulting actuaries indicate  that a full career worker with a salary  equivalent  to
average earnings would receive a pension equal to  54%  of pre-retirement pay at  a  total
contribution  rate of  12.3%, of which 7% is paid by the employer and 5.3% by the employee
(Wyatt 1990). However, this contribution  rate appears quite low by comparison  to the rate of
8.4% for the first pillar and the rates ranging between 7% and 18% imposed by the law on
professional  pensions.
In  summary, the  first pillar,  supported by  its annex, appears to  achieve well its
redistributive  and insurance objectives  and does not seem to be exceedingly  costly.  But the
second and third pillars are highly complex and opaque, with little attention being paid on
investment  performance  a-d administrative  efficiency. A considerable  amount of unintentional
and for the most part rather perverse redistribution appears to be taking place in the second
pillar.
THE SINGAPOREAN SYSTEM
The pension  system of Singapore  is organized  on national  provident  fund principles. All
workers, except self-employed  people, are required to participate  in the Central Provident  Fund
(CPF).  The CPF is a public agency that administers  the system, collects contributions,  keeps
records, pays out benefits, and invests the accumulated  funds.  The last-named  function is very
simple for the CPF since nearly all the funds are invested in government instruments.  The
investment  decisions  that matter are taken by two other very important  government  institutions,
9the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation  (GSIC).
The CPF was first established  in  1955 after a long debate that appeared to favor the
creation of  a  social insurance system, but was overruled by  the  London Colonial Office
(Queisser 1991). Contribution  rates were initially  quite low, no more than 10% divided equally
between employers and employees.  The system was a pure  mandatory retirement savings
scheme, forcing workers to save for their old age and allowing lump sum withdrawals  on
reaching  age 55.
Contribution  rates were raised to 13% in 1968 when a decision was also made to allow
interim, but controlled, withdrawals  for the purchase of houses.  Since then, there have been
several increases in contribution rates,  which reached a  staggering total of 50% in  1984.
Subsequently,  however, because of the negative impact on employment creation during the
recession  of 1985/6, the total contribution  rate was lowered to 35% by setting the employer's
rate to 10% (Vittas  and Skully 1991). More recently, the contribution  rate has stabilized  at the
still very high level of 40%, with a long-term  aim to divide this equally  between employers  and
employees. Because contributions  are divided equally between employers and employees,  this
corresponds  to an effective  rate of 33%, since contributions  of 40 are  paid out of total payroll
of 120.  An innovation  of recent years is the institution  of lower contribution  rates for people
aged over 55, while from the very beginning  workers earning less tCian  a specified minimum
were exempt from making contributions.
Over the years, additional  investment  opportunities  for investments  in approved  securities
and for spending  for education  were allowed, while health insurance was also included among
the benefits of the system. Also, since 1987, workers are required to keep a minimum  sum in
their account after reaching 55.  This is fixed by the CPF and is adequate to purchase on
retirement at age 60 a minimum  life annuity equal to about 25% of average earnings.
10The CPF is a defined contribution  system with no intentional  redistribution. Its primary
objective is a forced saving one for old age.  These days it is not a purely retirement savings
scheme since it allows use of funds for several other purposes.  Thus, its secondary  objective
is to encourage spending  on merit goods (health, housing, education). Although  redistribution
is not among its objectives, it is often argued that the CPF creates perverse redistribution
because of the low rates of interest credited on account  balances. This is particularly  so because
only high income workers can avail themselves  of the opportunities  to invest in other approved
but high yielding  assets (Asher 1991).
Although the CPF is a mono-pillar system, the Government of Singapore operates a
public assistance  pension scheme that offers to destitute  old people a small pension  that is half
the size of the minimum  pension imposed  under the CPF and amounts  to about 12% of average
earnings.
One of the strengths  of the CPF is its high efficiency and very low operating costs.  In
1990, total operating costs, including depreciation provisions, amounted to 0.53% of annual
contributions,  0.21% of wages and 0.10% of accumulated  assets (CPF 1990). These ratios are
very low by international  standards and compare very favorably with those achieved by large
employer-based  company schemes  in Britain and the US.  For instance, Postel, the company
managing the pension funds for the employees  of British Telecom  and the British Post Office,
has total operating  and investment  management  costs of 0.1 % or 10 basis points of total assets.
This is divided between 6 basis points for operating costs and 4 basis points for investment
management  costs.
Apart from the lack of redistributive  objectives,  two fundamental  weaknesses  of the CPF
are its very high total contribution  rate and the low rate of interest credited  on account  balances.
The latter has fluctuated  over the years but appears to have averaged around 2% in real terms
between 1960 and 1990 (Table 1).  Since 1987, the CPF rate of interest has been linked to the
average  of the rate on savings  deposits  and the rate on 12-month  fixed time deposits  with banks.
In view of the long-term and contractual  nature of CPF balances, a higher rate would appear
11more appropriate. Given  a growth rate of real wages of over 4%, the real rate of return appears
low to secure a high replacement rate, despite the very high contribution  rate.  For instance,
when pensions  are indexed to prices, working life is 40 years, retirement  life (with  an allowance
for survivor pensions)  is 20 years, a contribution  rate of at least 25% may be required to achieve
a replacement  ratio of 43% of final earnings, when the growth rate of real wages is 4% and the
real rate of return is 2% (Vittas 1992, Schwarz 1992). In Singapore, the effective  contribution
rate is 33%, but a substantial  part of savings  is used for investments  in housing  and other assets
as well as for the purpose of financing  education. Some of these assets could provide economic
support in retirement,  though it is clear that not all CPF savings would  be available. Moreover,
it should  be noted that even with a low replacement  rate, the absolute level of the pension  would
be quite high as a result of the high growth rate of real wages.
Table 1
Central  Provident  Fund of Singapore
Nominal and Real Rates of Interest
1960s  1970s  1980s  1960-90
Nonminal  Rate  4.62  6.20  5.27  5.36
Inflation  (CPI)  1.09  6.45  2.35  3.27
Real  Rate  3.50  -0.24  2.86  2.02
It is not easy to understand why the CPF rate of interest is low although, unlike most
other national provident funds, it has on average been positive in real terms. Nevertheless,
Malaysia  which has also long operated a national  provident fund has been able to pay a higher
real rate of interest than the Singaporean  CPF (Table 2).
One explanation  for the low rate of interest is that this is what members  prefer because
the rate of interest on mortgage  loans from the Housing  Development  Board is also linked  to the
same index.  However, a low mortgage  rate favors high income employees  and also encourages
excessive  investment  in housing. In Singapore, it is claimed that over 90% of people are owner
12occupiers, an impressive achievement  on the face of it.  But the ratio of house prices to annual
income appears to be near or even above 10.  By comparison, the house price to income ratio
in the US is less than 3.  This implies a very high price for the privilege of owner occupation
in Singapore. Part of this may be explained  by the shortage of land, but the heavy demand for
owner occupied housing, supported by the forced savings scheme of the CPF, may also be a
factor.
Table 2
Employees Provident Fund of Malaysia
Nominal and Real Rates of Interest
1960s  1970s  1980s  1960-90
Nominal  Rate  5.20  6.69  8.25  6.71
Inflation  0.91  5.89  3.27  3.34
Real Rate  4.25  0.75  4.82  3.26
A second explanation for the low interest rate is that this represents official policy that
accumulates  hidden reserves for the future needs of the Singaporean  economy,  an economy  that
is otherwise  without  natural resources. The CPF invests nearly all its funds in specially  issued
and nontradable  government bonds and in liquid deposit balances placed with MAS.  These
funds are  not used for domestic investment purposes but are  part of  the massive foreign
exchange reserves of Singapore. As is well known, Singapore  has by far the highest level of
foreign  exchange  reserves  on a per capita  basis. It is claimed,  though  no statistics  are published,
that very high real returns have been realized on foreign assets, especiaUy  by GSIC, which
invests in foreign equities in perhaps a similar fashion to the Kuwait Investment  Office (KIO).
There is no reason to doubt these claims  although, because of the complete  lack of transparency
and publicity, it is also impossible  to corroborate them.
To summarize, the Singaporean  pension system is a defined contribution  scheme with a
very high contribution  rate and a rather modest  but positive real rate of return on accumulated
balances. It is characterized  by very low operating costs and by the build-up  of massive hidden
13reserves through the accumulation of allegedly high yielding foreign exchange assets.  The
system does not have redistributive objectives, though a very modest public assistance pension
is paid to destitute  old people  and some  unintentional  but perverse redistribution  may take place.
Its main objectives  are forced saving for old age and spending on merit goods.
THE CHILEAN SYSTEM
The new Chilean  system was introduced  in 1981. It is a mandatory  retirement savings
scheme  that was created to replace an insolvent  social  pension  system  that operated  on a "pay-as-
you-go"  basis. The scheme  requires all employees  to contribute 10%  of their earnings  until their
normal retirement  age, which is 65 for men and 60 for women. No contribution  is imposed on
employers, although  they are required to withhold  employee  contributions  and transfer them to
the account  holding  companies. On retirement, workers must either purchase  a life annuity from
an insurance company or arrange a schedule  of programmed  withdrawals  from their account.
Lump sum payments  are allowed only if account  balances exceed the sum required to purchase
an annuity equal to 70% of final pay.
Like the Singaporean  CPF, the Chilean  system is a defined contribution  system based on
individual  capitalization  accounts, where pension  benefits  depend  on the contributions  made over
a person's working career and the investment  income  earned on accumulated  balances. Workers
are required to purchase term life and disability  insurance  and to pay an additional  commission
to cover the premiums for these insurance policies  as well as the operating  costs of the system.
The Chilean system has some unique characteristics.  It is government mandated and
regulated, but completely  privately managed by a number of authorized pension management
companies, known  as Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones  or AFPs.  To ensure simplicity
and transparency,  regulations  impose  a strict limit  of "one account  per worker" and "one pension
fund per AFP" (Vittas  and Iglesias 1992). Affiliates  receive  regular statements  with information
about the credited  contributions  and the investment  income of their fund.
14To ensure the solvency of the system, the pension funds are legally separated from the
management  companies. Strict rules are imposed  on AFPs, both regarding their capital  reserves,
the investment  of pension fund assets, and their performance  relative to the average for the AFP
industry as a whole.  Investment  rules emphasize  safety and profitability. A certain amount of
diversification  is required and for this purpose maximum  limits are imposed on portfolio shares
in different classes of instruments  as well as in instruments  of different issuers. No attempt is
made to direct the investment  of funds in high priority economic  or social projects. The system
is subject to strict, even draconian, regulation and to very close and effective supervision.
A very important feature of the system is the individual  choice granted to affiliates to
transfer their accounts between AFPs.  Individual  choice is expected to maintain pressure on
AFPs to compete and operate efficiently,  though experience  has shown that unlimited  choice to
transfer accounts may result in very high operating costs, mostly because of publicity and
marketing  expenses and the actual account switching  costs.  Individual  choice in the purchase
of annuities has also given rise to high publicity and selling costs.
During  the first ten years of its operation,  the AFP has been remarkably  successful. The
annual real rate of return on pension fund assets has averaged over  13% and total balances
reached nearly 30% of national income.  Although this impressive performance of the AFP
system is the result of the economic  recovery of the Chilean  economy  and is linked first to the
rise in real interest rates and then to their substantial  fall, there is little doubt that, but for the
existence  of the AFP system, the vast majority of Chilean workers would not have been able to
partake in the high investment  returns and remarkable  appreciation  of capital values of the late
1980s.
As a defined  contribution  system, the Chilean system is ostensibly  a mono-pillar  system
with no intentional  redistribution. Some redistribution  may take place, however, through the
governme... guarantee that workers with at least 20 years of contributions  will always receive
the minimum pension.  It is not clear how many workers will benefit from this guarantee.
Clearly,  this depends on  the  future relationship between wage growth and  real  returns.
15Estimates  put the proportion of workers that might benefit to between 40% and 50% (Gillion
and Bonilla 1992), though the burden on the government  may be rather small given that it will
only have to make up for the shortfall between a worker's AFP pension and the minimum
pension. Some estimates  put this burden at no more than 1  % of GDP, though these calculations
are extremely sensitive  to assumptions  regarding the values of basic parameters (Schwarz and
Vittas 1992). The Government  of Chile also pays minimum  pensions  to destitute old persons,
but the number of potential beneficiaries  appears to be small and eligibility  is subject to strict
means testing.
In addition to the guarantee regarding minimum pensions, the authorities impose on
AFPs, and guarantee in case of AFP failure, a minimum investment return relative to the
average for all pension funds.  The government  also guarantees, subject to specified  limits, the
value of life annuities with insurance companies.
Some  features  of the Chilean  scheme  give  rise to regressive  redistribution  in favor  of high
income  workers. This arises from two main sources. First, because  the structure  of commission
charges includes both a flat fee and a per valorem fee, low income workers are effectively
credited with a much lower rate of return than high income workers. Data for the first ten years
of the AFP system show that low income workers obtained  a real rate of return of 7.5% against
10.5% for high income workers  and 13% for the totality  of the pension fund (Vittas  and Iglesias
1992). The difference is caused by the imposition  of the flat fee, which in the initial years of
the scheme  was quite high, but which has declined significantly  in real terms.  In fact, several
AFPs have now abolished  their flat fees altogether. Unintentional  redistribution  may also arise
from variations in returns among AFPs, though these are limited by the required minimum
relative investment  returns on pension funds.
The second perverse redistribution  arises from the forced use of annuities. In theory, life
annuities should take account of the shorter life expectancy  of poorer people or people from
particularly arduous occupations. In practice, however, it seems  that low income workers, not
only do not benefit from lower annuity prices, but may also pay much higher commission
16charges for their life annuities than high income workers. The extent of perverse redistribution
through  the use of life annuities  is not known,  but appears to give rise to concern among  Chilean
policy makers and analysts.
Another  point of concern is the high level of operating costs.  Operating costs charged
on affiliates, after deducting the premiums paid for term life and disability insurance, amount
on average to 15.4% of annual contributions, 1.54% of wages, and 2.3% of total assets.  A
comparison  of the experience of Singapore  and Chile shows that, depending  on which ratio is
used, the Chilean  system was 29, 7 and 23 times more expensive  than the Singaporean  scheme.
Operating costs in Chile are higher than those of the Employees Provident  Fund in Malaysia.
although they are much smaller than those of the Zambian national provident fund (Table 3).
Two of these three ratios can be very misleading. First, the ratio of operating costs to
contributions  is distorted by the size of the contribution  rate.  Given that most expenses of a
pension system depend on  the number of affiliates and are  insensitive to  the size of  the
contributions,  a country with a high contribution  rate will tend to report a low ratio of operating
costs to contributions, and vice versa.  Singapore with a contribution  rate of 40% of nominal
wages has a much higher flow of annual contributions  than Chile where the contribution  rate is
only 10%.  Malaysia had a nominal  contribution  rate of 20% in 1989 (raised to 22% in 1992),
while the Zambian rate was 10%.  Second, the ratio of operating costs to total assets is affected
by the age and maturity of the system. A mature system with a large accumulation  of balances
wil tend to report a lower cost to assets ratio.  In contrast, the third ratio, the ratio of operating
costs to annual wages, is unaffected  by these distortions  and is perhaps the most relevant for
comparing  operating efficiency.  This stil  shows the Chilean system to be seven times more
expensive than the Singaporean  one.
Operating  costs are high in Chile for two main reasons. First, computerization  is much
less advanced  than in Singapore  and there is considerable  duplication  in both computer systems
and branch networks for the collection of contributions and payment of pensions.  Second,
expenditure  on publicity and advertising  is quite high in order to encourage switching  between
17AFPs.  Because  of the lack of a central computer  and clearing system, account switching  costs
are not insignificant. Although often overlooked, account switching  also imposes heavy costs
on employers, who are required to withhold contributions  from payroll and pay them over to
individual AFPs according to the choice of their workers.  High marketing costs also bedevil
the life annuity market.  The Chilean authorities are considering  various measures to reduce
operating  costs. These include restrictions  on the frequency  of the right to transfer  accounts  and
restrictions on the nature and size of marketing  costs.  Some consideration  is also given to the
regulation  of the structure of commissions  paid to agents, especially in the life annuity market.
Table 3
Operating  Costs and Investment Returns
Singapore  Malaysia  Zambia  Chile
1990  1989  1988/9  1990
Operating  Costs as % of
Annual Contributions  0.53  1.99  51.7  15.4
Average Total Assets  0.10  0.18  6.8  2.3
Covered Annual Wages  0.21  0.40  5.17  1.54
Real Investment  Returns
on Individual  Accounts  2.86  4.82  -55.0*  7.5-10.5
(during 1980s)
guesstimate  based on nominal rate of interest of 5% and average inflation rate of
135%.
The data on investment returns, which are calculated after the deduction oZ  operating
costs, show that Chilean workers did better on balance than either Malaysian or Singaporean
workers, although  investment  returns in these two countries also benefitted from the high real
interest rates that prevailed  in many  countries during the 1980s. However, the concern in Chile
arises from the realization  that the very high investment  returns of the 1980s  are unlikely  to be
18continued in the future and lower operating costs may then become crucial for the net financial
results of the system.
To summarize, the Chilean scheme is a government mandated  but privately managed
system.  It is a defined contribution  system based on individual  capitalization  accounts.  It is
very simple  aw)d  transparent  and is supported  by strict and effective  regulation  and supervision.
The  system benefits from important government guarantees that include the  provision of
minimum  pensions, which implies that it is not strictly speaking  a mono-pillar  system. Over the
first ten years of its existence, the Chilean system has achieved abnormally high real rates of
return, but it has also been characterized  by very high operating costs.
SWISS  CHILANPORE:  THE WAY FORWARD?
The idea of Swiss Chilanpore  is based on a pension refcrm strategy that combines the
best features of each country, while avoiding their weaknesses.  Thus, a reformed pension
system would be a multi-pillar system comprising two compulsory pillars and one or  two
voluntary ones.
The inclusion  of compulsory  pillars is based on the need to support retired workers with
low  lifetime earnings  and  limited  savings (redistribution) and  on  the  presumption that
individuals,  especially  younger workers, are myopic  with respect to their retirement needs and
will not save adequately for their old age (forced saving).  It is also based on the need to
discourage  moral hazard and free riding behavior  by those who fail to provide for their old age
and intend to rely on the generosity and charity of their fellow human  beings.  Given the way
society  treats the very poor and homeless  people, this argument  has always sounded  to me a little
spurious  and a concoction  of academic  theoreticians. But although  one may have doubts about
its  practical  significance, it  is  difficult to  deny its  intellectual relevance.  Compulsory
participation  may be a more pragmatic consideration  in overcoming  the adverse selection bias
that afflicts annuity markets.  Finally, an important  factor is the provision of insurance  against
correlated risks such excessive longevity  and high inflation
19Whatever the rationale for compulsory  participation, it is important to emphasize the
responsibility  of government to ensure that compulsory  pillars function properly, are fair and
equitable, and achieve their financial  and social objectives.  However, government also has a
responsibility  to regulate  and supervise  voluntary  pillars, especially  if it provides fiscal  incentives
for their promotion  or, as is almost always the case, the private markets  suffer from information
asymmetries  and the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection,  agency costs and free riding
mentioned  in the introduction  of this paper.  Thus, government has a role to play even in the
case of voluntary pillars, although its responsibility is clearly much stronger in the case of
compulsory  ones.
The Frst  Pillar
The first pillar would be a defined benefit plan and would follow the approach of the
Swiss first pillar.  It would be based on the principles of solidarity (i.e. it would operate on a
"pay-as-you-go"  basis) as well  as the principles  of proportionality, indexation  and actualization,
and lifetime  earnings. As in the Swiss system,  the first pillar would consist of two parts: a flat
rate full career minimum pension; and an earnings related pension.  In  addition, a public
assistance pension, perhaps equal to half the minimum pension and subject to  strict means
testing, could be paid to old people with insufficient  means.
The first part would pay a minimum  pension that would be fixed irrespective  of salary
level.  The full minimum  pension would be paid for a career of say 40 years (though  a shorter
or longer full working career may be used) and would be pro-rated by the actual length of each
worker's career.  The minimum  pension  could be set equal to 15% or 20% of average  earnings.
Ideally, all pension payments  should be linked to net earnings, i.e. earnings after the deduction
of payroll contributions  to the pension  system. This part would have a redistributive  objective.
The second part of the first pillar pension  would be earnings related.  It would  be based
on average actualized  lifetime earnings and could amount to an additional 15% to 20% of net
average  earnings. Actualization  of lifetime  earnings  could be based on the wage index or on the
20price index.  The second part would provide an affordable  level of intergenerational  Lsurance
with regard to a desirable minimum  replacement  rate for workers with average wages and full
careers.
Both elements of the first pillar pension would be indexed, although the choice of
indexation could be either to prices or to wages.  Perhaps, the Swiss solution of using the
arithmetic mean of the two indices would be a good compromise,  especially  in countries where
real wages do not follow a constant upward trend.
The contribution  rate for the first pillar would depend on the demographic  structure of
the labor force.  A rate between 5% and 10% would be adequate for most countries.  In
addition, a reasonable state contribution  might be appropriate. If the old age dependency  ratio
were to  increase to  such an  extent as  to  require a  higher contribution rate  for financial
equilibrium  of the first pillar, consideration  should  be given to increasing  the normal  retirement
age (or what amounts  to the same thing, an increase in the length of a fulU  career).  This would
clearly lower the old age dependency  ratio or the effective  replacement  rate and would mitigate
the financial  pressures on the pillar.
The Second Pillar
The second pillar would be a defined contribution  plan with individual capitalization
accounts.  It would be based on the principles of private management  and individual choice,
simplicity  and transparency,  safety and profitability,  strict regulation  and effective  supervision,
and operating efficiency.
The second pillar would aim to pay a pension  equal to 30% to 40% of actualized  average
lifetime net earnings (or of  final year net earnings).  There would be a minimum rate of
contribution  that would be set in the light of projected  growth rate of real wages, real rates of
return, and normal lengths of working and retirement lives.  A contribution  rate between 10%
and 15% would be adequate, unless there was a big negative gap between real returns and the
21growth  of real  earnings. Because  the first pillar  would  be based  on a combination  of a flat rate
full  career minimum  pension  and a lifetime-earnings-related  pension,  individual  workers  could
be allowed  to increase  their  contribution  rates  (up  to a specified  ceiling)  if the second  pillar  were
to be based  on final  year earnings  in order  to achieve  a 70%  integrated  replacement  rate.  The
fiscal  treatment  would  be based  on tax deferral  to provide  an incentive  for  compliance,  although
to minimize  its regressive  impact,  tax deferral  could  take  the form of tax credits  rather  than  full
deductibility  of contributions.
The  second  pillar  would  be very similar  in structure  and  regulation  to the Chilean  system,
except  in one  very  important  respect. To avoid  the  apparently  excessive  level  of operating  costs,
the system  would include a central agency  that would be responsible  for record keeping,
collecting  contributions,  paying  pensions  iad sending  out financial  statements. The central
agency  could  be a public  body or it could be jointly  owned  by all the private  companies  that
would  be allowed  to participate  in the investment  management  of the pension  funds. Its role
would  be similar  to that  a clearing  house  in banking  or futures  markets.
The investment  of pension  funds  would,  however,  be entrusted  to authorized  and well
regulated  and supervised  private  companies. Individual  workers  would have the choice to
transfer  the management  of their  funds  between  different  companies,  although  account  switching
would  then  involve  little  more  than  a series  of appropriate  entries  in the computer  of the central
operating  agency.  As in the case of Chile, investment  rules would emphasize  safety and
profitability,  there  would  be limits  to ensure  adequate  diversification  of risks, and there  would
be strict  regulation  and supervision  by an appropriate  supervisory  agency. To keep  marketing
costs  under  control,  there would  be strict  rules on advertising  and a regulation  of the structure
of commissions  paid to agents.  There would  also be detailed  rules on the sale of annuity
products.
Consideration  could be given to limiting  the range of products  offered  by both  pension
fund  management  companies  and by life insurance  companies. For instance,  the regulations
could include such rules as "one account  per worker" and "one investment  fund per fund
22management company",  which  are  essential elements of  the  current  Chilean  scheme.
Alternatively, pension management  companies could be allowed to offer a  small range of
investment  funds (say, an equity, bond and money  market fund), but the allocation  of individual
account  balances  among  these three funds  could follow strict age-related  rules.  Similarly,  limits
could  be imposed  on the offer of annuity  products, perhaps opting  for life annuities  with ten year
certain payments.
These restrictions on the range of products under offer could be justified on the grounds
that allowing unlimited individual choice in  the selection of investment funds and annuity
products would go  against the myopic behavior argument for justifying the institution of
compulsory  pillars in the first place.  The risk aversion of unsophisticated  investors  who tend
to select short-term, low-yielding  instruments  that are not suitable  for the long-term contractual
nature of these savings would be another justification.
As the second pillar would be a defined contribution  plan, indexation  of balances  would
not be appropriate. However, balances may be protected  from the vagaries of high and volatile
inflation  by requiring  or encouraging  pension funds to invest in indexed  long-term securities  or
in instruments that provide effective hedges against inflation.  On the other hand, annuity
products should be fully indexed.
A possible variation in this approach would be to entrust the central agency with the
selection of  investment fund managers on  the basis  of  transparent procedures and  clear
investment  guidelines. This would minimize  marketing  costs and would ensure that all workers
participate in the same national pool.  The risk of political interference with the utilization  of
funds and the awarding  of fund management  contracts would be strong arguments  against such
centralization of  decision making, though adequate safeguards could be developed.  This
approach is being gradually adopted  by the Employees  Provident  Fund of Malaysia, though its
experience with the new approach, which has been prompted  by the reduced borrowing needs
of the Malaysian  Government, is still limited.
23Voluntary PilJas
In addition to the compulsory  pillars, voluntary pension schemes may also be set up.
These could be created  by employers  or they could be established  by individuals  who would like
to aim for higher replacement  ratios than those envisaged under the compulsory  pillars.  As a
rule, voluntary  schemes should  benefit from the same fiscal incentives  as the compulsory  pillars.
In general, the fiscal treatment should allow the deductibility  of contributions  (perhaps up to
specified  ceiLings)  and exemption of investment  income (perhaps also up to specified limits),
while pensions should  be treated as any other source of income.
Although voluntary, employer pension schemes should be  regulated to  protect the
interests of workers and ensure equitable  and non-discriminatory  treatment. Thus, there should
be minimum vesting and portability provisions, while in defined benefit schemes, pensions
should be based on actualized average lifetime earnings rather than final year earnings (this
would  eliminate  the favorable  treatment  of senior  managers  and other high fliers). There should
also be prudential, fiduciary and custodial regulations,  though given the financial  responsibility
of employers detailed investment rules may not be necessary.
The scope for voluntary company-based  schemes would be much more limited under a
system  with two compulsory  pillars. To the extent  that companies  need to encourage  loyalty  and
firm-specific  training or to operate flexible employment  policies, they would have to develop
alternative compensation schemes that would be unrelated to the provision of  occupational
pensions.
Voluntary  personal pension  plans and annuity products would also need to be regulated
to protect the interests of consumers.  Such regulation and supervision should follow broadly
similar lines to  that of  banking and insurance companies and should emphasize stability,
efficiency  and fairness.
24CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has addressed  some of the issues raised it establishing  a pension  system. The
main focus has been on creating a system that can cope well with the objectives  of solidarity,
redistribution  and insurance against correlated risks, operating and investment  efficiency, and
accumulation  of sufficient  balances for the payment of adequate but affordable  pensions.
The paper does not discuss several important  issues such as ensuring high coverage and
compliance with the compulsory  pillars of the system, the interaction  between regulation and
financial market development,  or the problems of transition.  Two points that should perhaps
be stressed is that the proposed new structure  envisages  a continuing, though reduced, role for
a public pension pillar and a much reduced role for company-based  pension schemes.
A question  that might be raised is why favor a Swiss Chilanpore  system and not a Dutch
one. The main difference  between the first pillars  of the Netherlands  and Switzerland  is that the
Dutch system includes only a flat rate pension under its first pillar.  This is targeted at about
40% of average earnings and is financed with contributions  from all residents equal to 14.8%
of their earnings.  The cost of the Dutch system is clearly much higher than the Swiss.
Although flat rate systems are preferred by economists  because they involve fewer distortions
in incentives, the existence  of an earnings related  part in the first pillar would help  provide some
insurance  about a minimum  replacement  rate for workers with full careers and average  eanings.
A less generous flat rate system than the Dutch one would fail to provide a  floor to  the
replacement  rate.  Thus, the argument for including  a two parts in the first pillar is very much
one of keeping costs down while minimizing  risks by diversifying  across different providers.
The much  reduced role of occupational  pension  schemes  can be justified on two grounds.
First, occupational  pension schemes suffer from many shortcomings  related to intentional  and
unintentional  redistribution  among members  of different schemes. To the extent that they are
used as a personnel management tool, they are bound to penalize some workers more than
others.  Eliminating  these shortcomings  by appropriate regulations  regarding minimum  vesting,
25portability and indexation standards would weaken the incentive of  employers to  continue
sponsoring such plans.  The second argument is that, with declining stability in employment
patterns,  company-based schemes  would  become exceedingly unsuitable  for  providing
employment-based  social benefits such as pension and health insurance.
Finally, a word of caution is needed about the applicability  and relevance of a pension
reform strategy based on the outlines of this proposal.  Despite the rhetorical question in the
introduction  of this paper, there is reaUy  no blueprint for any type of reform that can be applied
in all countries, regardless of local circumstances  and conditions.  For instance, in countries
where national provident funds have failed patently, as has been the case in  most African
countries, because of  underdeveloped capital markets, weak administration, and  political
interference, the proposed multi-pillar  structure  would not have many chances  of success, unless
capital markets were reformed and the  regulatory machinery was much strengthened and
improved. In such countries, social insurance systems might be a preferable alternative  at this
juncture, especialy if they benefit from very favorable demographic  structures and if they are
properly designed to avoid the distortions that have afflicted the social insurance systems of
Latin American and Eastern European countries.  However, governments in  such countries
should not lose sight of the need to reform further their emerging social insurance systems in
the long run and to restructure them in due course towards the multi-pillar  approach advocated
in this paper.
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